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BOOK REVIEWS
A Treatise on the Law of Contracts. By Samuel Williston, Third
Edition by Walter H. E. Jaeger. Vols. 1 and 2. Mount Kisco, N.Y.: Baker,
Voorhis and Co. 1959. Pp. xxii, 826; pp. xv, 1095. $20 each.
If, as has been said, the Iaw of contracts is "the keystone of our civil
law,'" then the Williston treatise is indeed the keystone of our law of con-
tracts. In the forty years since the original edition appeared, it has gained
a pre-eminent place in that field. Quoted or cited by the courts of the United
States, Great Britain, and its Dominions as well, it has become the standard
authority. We begin our research on any question of contract law with
Williston. The preparation of a new edition of such a monumental work is
fraught with difficulties and is at best a thankless job. Endless painstaking
and patient research coupled with meticulous attention to detail are prime
requisites to success in such a venture. The task of the author-editor becomes
doubly difficult for his work must meet the high standard established by the
original edition, and at the same time be comprehensive in its coverage of
the quarter century since the second edition appeared. This entails analyzing
and sifting countless cases that the courts of more than fifty jurisdictions
have been "grinding out." Also, in line with the suggestions for changes and
innovations intended to increase the usefulness of the treatise made by
members of the judiciary and practising lawyers generally, as adverted to in
the preface, hundreds of legal periodicals would have to be examined for
articles, comments, notes and recent decisions which might prove useful to
the profession.
In my examination of these first two volumes of the new Williston, I
have been primarily concerned with what would interest the reader, pre-
sumably a member of the legal profession. Were I the reader, I should
hope to find in any given review the answers to the following questions:
What has been retained in the new edition? What are the principal changes?
What additions have been made? Has the treatise become more useful to
the practising attorney? In short, this review will seek to evaluate these
innovations and alterations.
The Williston text and its conceptual content have been largely retained.
Thus, adhering to Willistonian precept, the author takes a justifiable swipe
at that misbegotten and misleading expression "sometimes unrealistically
described as a 'meeting of the minds.' " 2 The general plan remains the same
and, fortunately for us who have used the former editions (and who among
practising lawyers hasn't?), chapter headings and section numbers have not
been changed. This makes possible the continued use of the index and its
annual supplement since they are keyed to sections. It will also be of service
to the courts when they quote or cite the third edition of this authoritative
work since they have become accustomed to referring to the earlier editions
I Seitz, Book Review, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 676 (1958).
2 Williston, The Law of Contracts § 1, at 2 (3rd ed. 1957).
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by section, rather than page numbers. Cases constituting judicial precedents
have been retained, as have statutory references.
What significant changes has Jaeger wrought? While there has been
adherence to the Williston text, this has been far from slavish. Changes in
content have been dictated by changes in the law, changes in style by the
increasing tempo of our lives. In former times, when there was more leisure
and less emphasis on "do it now," a somewhat involved sentence structure
was no deterrent to the avidly probing lawyer in quest of a solution to his
problem. Today, a certain impatience manifests itself with a style that is
ponderous and, at times, difficult to penetrate. Suffice it to say that the
author-editor has not sacrificed the Williston content, but by means of shorter
sentences, better paragraphing and some rearrangement, succeeded in pre-
senting a more facilely comprehensible text.
A prime example of comprehensive revision is chapter 6 dealing with
"Consideration," a topic dear to the heart of the practising lawyer. Here we
find the first substantial expansion and modification in size and content.
These are so far-reaching that one might almost consider this a wholly new
chapter; it is probably the most useful in volume 1. Section 103, which
formerly had an extensive discussion and evaluation of the views of earlier
writers on the subject of legal detriment and benefit in eight subsections, 8
has now been condensed into one section. Much of the former theoretical
discussion has been relegated to the footnotes and largely replaced by up-to-
the-minute cases. The discussion of these cases is of inestimable value to the
practitioner to whom they constitute a vital part of his stock in trade. Out-
put and requirements contracts are given thorough consideration in line
with their growing importance in commerce and industry. 4
 Most of the con-
fusion surrounding the use of the term "mutuality" is dispelled in Section
105A, "Mutuality of Obligation," wherein the author points out that the
confusion has resulted from the use of the term mutuality in three different
ways: mutuality of assent, mutuality of obligation and mutuality of remedies.
If the writers would clearly indicate in which sense the expression was
being used, most of the confusion could be obviated.
One significant change that may meet with criticism in some quarters
is the decrease in emphasis on the Restatement of the Law of Contracts. In
the preface to the prior edition, Professors Williston and Thompson state
that they have made it a "primary purpose in their undertaking to provide
such an exposition of the decisions and reasons supporting the rules of the
Restatement as might fairly take the place of the Treatise which was origi-
nally planned as a part of the [American Law] Institute's publication." In
the new edition, quotations from the Restatement and references thereto are
largely relegated to the footnotes. As the Restatement has achieved wide
acceptance, it is probable that the author-editor did not deem it necessary to
continue the use of the Treatise as a launching device. Furthermore, a num-
3
 Id. §§ 103-103G (rev. ed. 1936).
4
 Id. § 104A, "Bilateral 'Requirement' and 'Output' Contracts" (3rd ed. 1957).
5 Id. § 115C.
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ber of the new cases he has introduced quote or cite the Restatement and this
is indicated.
In the treatment of the Civil Law there is a change in emphasis. Instead
of occasional references to the Continental codes and systems of law, cases
from Louisiana and Quebec and references to their codes are incorporated in
the new edition, This seems logical enough, especially as the references to
the Civil Law in the previous edition were rather sketchy and of little if any
value to the attorney practising in a common law jurisdiction. It is con-
ceivable that this may occasion adverse comment from a few academicians
devoted to a superficial adherence to comparative law, but this reviewer
considers that the space thus saved has been used to much better advantage
by the introduction of new sections dealing with some of the newer manifesta-
tions of the common law or its statutory modifications.
The greatest change in Volume 2 occurs in chapter 13 which is de-
voted to joint duties and rights based on contracts. Many sections have been
combined, others rearranged. On the whole, the new arrangement seems more
logical, especially as the original section numbers still appear with cross
references to the sections with which they have been combined or merged.
New sections that have been added will be discussed in a subsequent part of
this review.
As to the footnotes: Here is an area of the greatest improvement. The
old page-after-page, unbroken phalanx of citations, unrelieved even by para-
graphs, has gone for good. In its place, we have terse characterizations, brief
digests and succinct quotations from the courts' opinions. The lawyer is im-
mediately advised of the nature of the case and its value to him in the prepa-
ration of his brief. No longer need he examine a seemingly endless array of
cases to determine whether finally there is one in point; he can now tell at a
glance. On the mechanical side, the use of bold-face type for the footnote
numbers is a welcome change, especially for those of us for whom the printed
word is getting smaller (in spite of bifocals) as the years go by. By way of
parenthetical observation, it seems as though some publishers cherish the fond
illusion that lawyers must have indestructible eyes needing no assistance from
the graphic arts.
But it is in the "what's new" department that we find Jaeger's principal
contribution. Of the material that has been added, certain sections require
special mention. Thus, the treatment of forbearance has been expanded by
the addition of several new sections in the chapter on consideration; it is
the best that has come to my attention. Other sections that have been added
to this chapter include: "Consideration and Tax Statutes," 5 "Lack of and
Failure of Consideration Distinguished," "Undertakings to Create Benefits
by Will," 7 and "Promise of Payment or Payment of Debt not Sufficient Con-
sideration."
The material on options, considered by some as barely adequate in the
Id. § 119A.
7 Id. § 119B.
B Id. § 120.
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••preceding editions, has been greatly augmented by the addition of new sec-
tions containing the recent cases. In conformity with the changing times, we
find "Acceptance by Telephone or Teletype,"° "Carriage of Goods by Land,
Sea and Air,'" and "Subscription and Allotment of Shares in New Com-
pany.''" Stipulations are treated as agreements not requiring consideration
and are given individual treatment."
The author's treatment of statutory modifications of the common law
by the use of tables is well illustrated by Section 219A dealing with the
current status of the seal, and statutes of limitations, citations being given
to code or statute. Similar tables are set out, dealing with the contractual
capacity of married women,' 3 the authority of executors or administrators to
continue a decedent's business," and the statutory modification of the
personal liability of trustees.' 5
 One of the most significant of these tabula-
tions deals with Veterans' Guardianship Statutes." This is invaluable to us
since there are nearly 30 million people who are classified as veterans. Un-
doubtedly, their problems involving contract law will increase enormously
With the passage of time and litigation may be expected to reflect this in-
crease. Statutory changes in joint obligations are tabulated in Section
336A, and those modifying the rule of survivorship in Section 344A. The
great advantage of these tables is that they enable the busy lawyer to see at
a glance what, if any, changes have been made in the common law of any
given jurisdiction by legislative enactment. Members of the bar may be
especially interested to learn that the new edition does justice to the Uniform
Commercial Code, it being quoted or cited wherever apposite.
In dealing with the contracts of agints and fiduciaries, the author-
editor has greatly expanded the treatment of apparent agency and agency
by estoppel." As the decisions in this area are in hopeless conflict and con-
siderable confusion has attended them, this extended treatment is fully
warranted, especially if it results in clarification of the basic concepts. In
the same chapter, in recognition of the growing importance of labor relations
and the agreements which underlie them, Jaeger has added two substantial
sections on labor organizations.
Very early in Chapter 13 entitled "Joint Duties and Rights Under
Contract" appears a series of entirely new sections dealing with a "case law
hybrid of recent origin and undetermined connotation," 1B the joint venture.'°
To embark upon this trail-blazing venture required a certain temerity; yet,
° Id. § 82A.
10 Id. § 9CBB.
11 Id. §
12 Id.	 §
13 Id. §
14 Id.
15 Id. §
16 Id. §
11 Id.	 §§
69B.
204A.
269A.
310A.
312A.
314A.
277, 277A, 277B, 277C, at 204-253.
19 Porter v. Cooke, 127 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 670 (1942),
rehearing denied, 317 U.S. 710 (1942).
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it seems to me that the eight sections devoted to the development of this
concept will prove of real value to our profession as well as to the business
community. There has been much controversy as to the nature of these
business associations, some writers contending that it is nought but a special
type of partnership." However, the author-editor demonstrates by careful
analysis of the case law that the courts have definitely rejected this con-
tention and declared the point venture to be sui generis, and perhaps, even
sui juris.2' He has, in the language used by the courts, drawn certain dis-
tinctions which seemed tenable to the latter and used in distinguishing be-
tween joint ventures and partnerships.22
The final chapter (Volume 2) is devoted to third party beneficiaries.
The subject is developed along traditional lines—creditor beneficiary, donee
beneficiary, and then various others, more or less related to the two principal
classes. The Massachusetts rule is treated under "Relief Under Strict Doc-
trine of Privity of Contract."23 Here the English cases are also to be found,
as well as the familiar creditor's bill and statutory remedies for beneficiaries
under life insurance policies. As there are a variety of statutes which deal
with one phase or another of the third party principle, the author has in-
cluded a comprehensive discussion of the Uniform Commercial Code and
other statutes with a summary in a comprehensive table showing the vari-
ants. 24
In what may be the most controversial of the new sections, "Recovery
by Undertermined Beneficiary on Warranty," 25 Jaeger takes the position
that the third party beneficiary principle should be applied in actions on
product warranties. Since the decision in Winterbottom v. Wright , 28 where
a casual dictum of the English court led our jurists into the error of a curious
privity requirement although that case did not even involve a manufacturer,
a "general rule" was gradually developed. However, as one court has ob-
served, the exceptions to this "rule" have grown and grown "until, in all truth—
much like the boa constrictor swallowing itself—the exceptions devoured the
rule."27 Logic and some well-reasoned cases are on the author's side when
he says,
It seems curious that where third party beneficiaries have
been recognized for so many decades in so many fields, there should
be so much reluctance to recognize them in their most important
aspect; ofttimes, in a matter of life or death. 28
12 Williston, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 318 et seq.
20 Nichols, Joint Ventures, 36 Va. L. Rev. 425 (1950).
21 Williston, op. cit. supra note 2, § 318B, especially at 592.
22 Rae v. Cameron, 112 Mont. 159, 114 P.2d 1060 (1941) ; McRoberts v. Phelps,
391 Pa. 591, 138 A.2d 439 (1958).
23 Williston, op. cit. supra note 2, § 360.
24 Id
. § 367.
25 Id. § 378A.
28 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
27 Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d
873 (1958),
28 Williston, op. cit. supra note 2, § 378A at 976.
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Referring to the same problem, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court had this to say:
The time has come for us to recognize that that asserted
general rule no longer exists. In principle it was unsound. It tended
to produce unjust results. It has been abandoned by the great
weight of authority elsewhere. 29
In any case, the author-editor suggests a feasible and logical solution;
in the interest of the ultimate consumer, it should be generally followed.
Finally, another fertile field for the application of the third party
principle is encountered in labor relations. This the author covers in a sec-
tion entitled "Collective Labor Agreements." )
 Dwelling on the case law
resulting from the federal legislation, he emphasizes the opinions in Associa-
tion of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corpora-
tions' and United Textile Workers of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama 32
to the effect that personal rights of employees must be sought in the en-
forcement by state courts. He writes, as to these personal rights, or as the
Chief Justice of the United States describes them, these "uniquely personal
rights":
The Westinghouse and Lincoln Mills cases have left the
federal courts somewhat baffled; some intriguing questions have
presented themselves: What are 'personal' (described in a con-
curring opinion in the Westinghouse case as 'uniquely personal')
rights of an employee, as distinguished from union rights? What
is the theory of enforcement of individual rights by an aggrieved
employee? Is he a third party beneficiary, or are the terms of the
collective labor agreement embodied in the terms of his employ-
ment contract? What is the result if the state does not recognize
third party beneficiaries? 33
Resolution of these questions will undoubtedly prove a fruitful source of
litigation, especially when regarded in conjunction with the problems created
by the Landrum-Griffin legislation."
In restrospect, it must be said that the new edition of Williston is an
unsurpassed partner for the practitioner, not merely in contract law, but in
all the related fields of sales, negotiable instruments, suretyship and guaranty,
contracts of carriage by land, sea and air, bailments and a host of others.
New sections and attractive footnotes greet the eye. The inclusion of cases
decided by the courts (speaking the language of Williston) during the past
two decades greatly enhance the utility of Jaeger's work. All in all, the new
29 Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946).
39 Williston, op. cit. supra note 2, 	 379A,
$1 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
22 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
33 Williston, op. cit. supra note 2, 379A, at 1001.
84 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519 (1959),
29 U.S.C. § 401-531 (Supp. 1959).
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edition is worthy of the master himself. We of the legal profession owe
Walter Jaeger a lasting debt of gratitude for a job well done.
MICHAEL LEO LOONEY
Of the District of Columbia,
New York and Massachusetts
Bars
Conflict of Interest and Federal Service. By the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, Special Committee on the Federal Conflict
of Interest Laws. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960, pp. xvi, 336.
$5.50.
Ever since it was pronounced by the Highest Authority) there has
probably been little disposition to quarrel with the proposition that, "No
man can serve two masters." But, even in the God-and-mammon context
in which it was originally stated, the principle has been one whose applica-
bility in specific factual situations is frequently most difficult to determine.
That the principle has applicability in contexts other than the theo-
logical has been underscored in recent years by widespread publicity over
"five-percenters," influence peddlers, gifts to government officials, invest-
ment portfolios of nominees to Cabinet and sub-Cabinet positions, and the
like. That some government servants have improperly (in the ethical sense)
served two masters, there can be no doubt. But where the line between
propriety and impropriety (in the legal sense) is drawn is a matter of at least
considerable uncertainty; where it should be drawn is a matter of more than
the semantics of the Scriptural text.
With characteristic concern for the public interest the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York in 1955 established a special committee of dis-
tinguished lawyers, 2 with a staff under the direction of two university pro-
fessors, 3 to make a study and report on the federal conflict of interest laws.
This volume is the result. 4
At the outset, the Committee wisely eschews the function of providing
remedies for all the shortcomings of the operations of government. It con-
fines its concern to the activities of employees and ex-employees in the
executive branch, and in this category its study is limited to the matter of
1 Matthew, 6:24. The parallel recital in Luke, 16:13 occurs immediately after the
Parable of the Unjust Steward. Luke, 16:1-9.
2 Roswell B. Perkins (Chairman) of New York; Howard F. Burns, of Cleveland;
Charles A. Coolidge, of Boston; Paul M. Herzog, of New York; Alexander C. Hoag-
land, Jr., of New York; Everett L. Hollis, of New York; Charles A. Horsky, of Wash-
ington; John V. Lindsay, John E. Lockwood and Samuel I. Rosenman, all of New
York.
3 Professor Bayless Manning, of Yale University Law School, Staff Director, and
Professor Marver H. Bernstein, of Princeton University, Associate Staff Director.
4 A companion volume embodying the Committee's research into, and evaluation
of, the existing conflict-of-interest laws is scheduled for publication in 1961.
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